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Abstract 
Climate change damages the capital stock, affects economic production and the welfare of households in 
regions suffering the impact or that are economically linked with them. These economic effects have been 
quantified for seven climate impact categories: river floods, coastal floods, agriculture, energy supply, 
droughts, windstorms and human mortality. Due to the limited coverage of climate impacts, the assessment 
does not evaluate the full economic impacts of climate change in Europe. Human mortality from extreme 
heat dominates the economic climate impacts, yet its contribution is strongly dependent on the monetary 
valuation of human lives. The magnitude of welfare losses in the Southern regions (Central Europe South and 
Southern Europe) is estimated to be several times larger compared to that in the North of Europe. Limiting 
warming to 2oC would halve economic impacts compared to a 3oC scenario, while achieving the stringent Paris 
target of 1.5oC would lower welfare loss by 75%. 
  
2 
 
Executive summary 
Climate change damages the capital stock, affects economic production and the welfare of households in 
regions suffering the impact or that are economically linked with them. For seven climate impact categories 
those economic effects have been quantified: river floods, coastal floods, agriculture, energy supply, droughts, 
windstorms and human mortality. Due to the limited coverage of climate impacts, the assessment does not 
evaluate the full economic impacts of climate change in Europe. Human mortality from extreme heat 
dominates the economic climate impacts, yet its contribution is strongly dependent on the monetary valuation 
of human lives. The magnitude of welfare losses in the Southern regions (Central Europe South and Southern 
Europe) is estimated to be several times larger compared to that in the North of Europe. Limiting warming to 
2oC would halve economic impacts compared to a 3oC scenario, while achieving the stringent Paris target of 
1.5oC would lower welfare loss by 75%.  
 
Quantifying economic impacts of climate change 
The JRC PESETA IV project considers three future global warming levels (compared to pre-industrial): those set 
out in the Paris Agreement (1.5 and 2°C) as well as a high level of warming (3°C).  
The economic analysis was done for seven impact categories: river floods, coastal floods, agriculture, energy 
supply, droughts, windstorms and human mortality from extreme heat and cold. It is very important to stress 
that the economic assessment of climate impacts is incomplete: the four other climate impacts categories of 
the PESETA IV project were not considered because these impacts could not be monetized (e.g., loss of alpine 
tundra, shift in ecological domains). There are other relevant climate impacts whose economic valuation is not 
possible given the current state-of-the-art. That is for example the case for effects associated with triggering 
climate tipping points, ecosystems degradation and loss of habitats and species. Therefore, the integrated 
economic impacts presented here do not constitute the totality of economic impacts of climate change in 
Europe.  
The economic analysis was made with a general equilibrium model in a comparative static context, in which 
we evaluated how climate conditions at different levels of global warming affect the economy as of today. 
Hence the results estimated address the question: "How the current economy would be affected if 1.5, 2 and 
3oC of global warmings would occur today?" This method avoids making assumptions about highly uncertain 
demographic trends and the future structure and size of the economy, and allows to report results which are 
due to climate impacts only.  
 
Economic impacts of climate change 
Exposing present economy to global warming of 3oC would result in an annual welfare loss of at least 175 
€billion (1.38% of GDP). Under a 2oC scenario the welfare loss would be 83 €billion/year (0.65% of GDP), 
while restricting warming to 1.5oC would reduce welfare loss to 42 €billion/year (0.33% of GDP).  
While the estimated welfare loss with 2oC global warming is very similar to that in PESETA III, the welfare loss 
with 3oC global warming is lower than in the high emission scenario of PESETA III. That is because in the 
PESETA III high emission scenario the temperature is considerably higher than 3oC. This effect is most 
pronounced for coastal flooding, with impacts in PESETA III nearly 4-fold those of PESETA IV, as sea level rise 
is projected to accelerate in time. 
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Figure 1: Welfare loss (% of GDP) from selected climate impacts for the EU and UK, and for the constituent EU macro 
regions, for three levels of global warming. The results represent change with respect to current economy. The numerical 
values for each region and impact category can be found in Table 7. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Sectoral impacts 
Human mortality from extreme heat dominates the (incomplete) overall economic impacts. The related 
welfare loss would reach 36, 65 and 122 €billion at 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC global warming, respectively. More 
than 80% of the mortality related EU welfare loss is estimated for southern EU regions. It should be noted 
that the share of human mortality loss to the total economic impact depends strongly on the appreciation of 
the economic value of life.  
River and coastal floods are the second most significant source of welfare loss in the EU, particularly in 
northern and central EU regions. Flooding impacts constitute 8.5 €billion of welfare loss with 1.5oC, which 
increases to 16 €billion with 2oC and to 40 €billion with 3oC global warming. It should be noted that sea levels 
will continue to rise long after climate has stabilised at a specific warming level, e.g. sea levels with 2oC in 
2160 will be much higher than with 2oC in 2060. This means that coastal flood impacts projected here for a 
warming level are very conservative. 
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Figure 2: Welfare change (% of GDP) from selected climate impacts excluding mortality for the EU and UK, and for the 
constituent EU macro regions, for three levels of global warming. The results represent change with respect to current 
economy. The numerical values for each region and impact category can be found in Table 7. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Changes in droughts impacts lead to an increase in welfare in northern Europe, but become a source of 
welfare reduction in southern and western EU regions. With 1.5°C global warming the overall welfare loss 
from drought is limited to 0.7 €billion, but it grows to 10.6 €billion with 3°C global warming. 
Changes in agriculture yield also lead to an increase in welfare in the north and a reduction in the south of 
Europe. For the EU and UK, this results into a small positive welfare effect at low levels of warming (1.5 and 
2°C), which is reversed at higher levels of warming (3°C). The energy model simulates a positive effect of 
global warming on energy supply in the north and an opposite trend in the south. These regional effects are 
balanced at 1.5oC and result in a small increase in welfare at 2oC and 3oC.  
 
The North-South divide 
There is a clear North-South divide in the regional distribution of welfare losses. The sum of impacts in 
northern regions are relatively small or even positive (e.g. northern Europe with 1.5oC and 2oC) as the regions 
experience gains from climate change for some of the sectors considered (agriculture, drought, energy 
supply). In southern EU regions almost all of the impacts are negative (except droughts in Central Europe 
South with 1.5oC and energy supply). As a result, the magnitude of overall welfare loss in southern regions is 
several times larger compared to those in the North of Europe. 
 
Spill-over effects from climate impacts in the rest of the world 
The EU economy is affected not only by climate change impacting upon its economy, but also indirectly 
through international trade with countries that also experience climate-related damages. The findings of 
PESETA IV confirm a more comprehensive analysis performed in PESETA III, which showed that international 
spill-over effects could increase the internal EU welfare loss by approximately 20%. A detailed analysis of 
agricultural yield in PESETA IV shows that agricultural spill-over effects can reach 2 €billion with 1.5oC and 8 
€billion with 3oC. With 2oC the negative transboundary effects dominate the positive EU's own welfare 
increase leading to a welfare loss from agriculture. Further exploratory research on probabilistic perspective 
on climate change impacts illustrated that the increase in global temperature leads not only to reduction in 
potential yields but also to increase in uncertainty regarding the production levels. 
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Approach 
The economic analysis is made with a multi-sector, multi-country computable general equilibrium model 
(Climate assessment General Equilibrium, CaGE model), which integrates the various climate impact channels 
in a consistent system. The economic integration with the CaGE model is made in a comparative static 
context, where future climate affects the economy as of today. The resulting estimates thus address the 
question: "what the economy would look like if the future climate occurs today?"  
The methodology interprets the direct impacts estimated by the biophysical models in the economic 
framework. Some of the main features of the interface between the biophysical damage and the economic 
modelling include damage to capital stock, sectoral productivity reduction, and change in consumption.  
The economic analysis for each climate impact computes the economic impacts in terms of welfare 
(consumption) changes, using as input the direct damages estimates from the biophysical impact 
assessments. Welfare losses are in general larger than the direct damages because it accounts for indirect 
effects in the rest of the sectors of the economy (e.g. agricultural yield losses impacting the agro-food 
industry). 
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1 Introduction 
The new European Commission's political guidelines place climate action on top of its agenda, in particular 
with the recently announced European Green Deal (European Commission, 2019). The European Green Deal 
will reinforce at the European level global ambitious initiatives, mainly in the framework of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change.  
The Joint Research Centre (JRC) PESETA projects have helped to improve the understanding of the possible 
consequences of climate change for Europe. The aim of the JRC PESETA IV project is to further improve that 
understanding, narrowing the remaining knowledge gaps1. The study follows three stages: climate modelling, 
assessing the biophysical impacts for a number of sectors and hazards (called ‘impact categories’2), and the 
economic analysis of selected impacts.  
The JRC PESETA IV project (Feyen et al. 2020) considers three future global warming levels (compared to pre-
industrial): those set out in the Paris Agreement (1.5 and 2°C) as well as a high level of warming (3°C)3, which 
can be interpreted as a scenario with only limited mitigation. The biophysical assessment is made for eleven 
climate impact categories: river floods, coastal floods, droughts, agriculture, energy supply, mortality from 
heat and cold waves, windstorms, habitat loss, forest fires, water, and forest ecosystems.  
This report focuses on the economic analysis of impacts, considering the six sectors that have provided 
impact information expressed in economic terms (river floods, coastal floods, droughts, agriculture, energy 
supply, and windstorms4), and impact information that can be interpreted in economic terms (mortality 
impacts of heat and cold extremes). The results are presented in three perspectives: firstly, the individual 
results of each of the seven impact categories; second, the ranking of the impacts in Europe according to their 
relative magnitudes; and, thirdly, the broad regional pattern of climate impacts across Europe. 
At this point, it is very important to stress that the economic assessment of climate impacts in Europe is 
incomplete for a number of reasons. There are four other climate impacts categories of the PESETA project 
which are not economically integrated because they do not provide impacts in monetary terms. Furthermore, 
there are other relevant climate impacts which are not considered within the project because their 
quantification is not possible given the current state-of-the-art; for example, that is the case of losses due to 
climate catastrophic events, ecosystems degradation and loss of habitats and species. In fact, those difficult 
to quantify impact categories are the ones which can be potentially more harmful. In a sense, the more 
demanding the quantification of the impact is, the more relevant that impact category seems to be.   
Therefore, summing the estimates of the seven climate impact does not constitute the totality of climate 
impacts in Europe. In a similar study of climate impacts in the US5, aggregated economic impacts are not 
reported in order to avoid misinterpretation of the aggregate as the overall climate damage. 
The economic assessment in this report consists of a welfare analysis that integrates the impacts into an 
economic multi-sector, multi-country model6, in a similar way to the analysis made in the JRC PESETA III 
project (Szewczyk et al. 2018)7. The integration allows for the assessment of each impact considered with a 
uniform economic metric, consumer welfare measured as real private consumption. The valuation of climate 
impacts with that model also allows to consider the indirect effects of climate change (e.g. due to trade 
flows), in addition to the direct damages.  
The report also explores the degree to which climate impacts from the rest of the world could affect Europe. 
Climate-related impacts on production and consumption in non-EU countries affect EU countries via 
                                           
1 One of them relate to the role adaptation can play to reduce climate impacts. The project has assessed 
adaptation options with a cost-benefit framework for river floods and coastal flooding.  
2 The climate impact categories refer both to specific impact sectors (e.g. agriculture and energy) and hazards 
(e.g. river flooding). Some of the hazard studies consider several sectors (e.g. droughts considers impacts 
on the agriculture sector), yet the project has not integrated them in a consistent way. 
3 Those warming levels are achieved at different times, depending on the specific RCP (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5) and 
climate model (the project considers 11 climate runs for each RCP). 1.5°C is approximately reached by 
2025-2030, 2°C by 2040-2050 and 3°C by 2060-2070. 
4 The windstorms results (Spinoni et al. 2020) are negligible (with welfare changes smaller than 0.01% of 
GDP). Then this sector does not have a dedicated section in the economic report. 
5 Martinich and Crimmins (2019). 
6 The model uses the results from the RCP8.5 scenario. 
7 The methodology used is the same as in the JRC PESETA III report; the coverage of sectors differs slightly 
(labour productivity was in PESETA III but not in PESETA IV; PESETA III focused on energy demand while 
PESETA IV focuses on energy supply; and PESETA IV considers droughts, which was not covered in PESETA 
III). 
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international trade. For example, climate-induced reduction in agricultural yields in North America will lead to 
an increase in its imports and a reduction in exports of agricultural goods, all having implications for its 
trading partners, including the EU. This report analyses the transboundary effects from agricultural crops 
production8 from out-of-the-EU regions onto the EU economy,  
The report finally presents an exploratory work on the risk perspective of climate impacts for agriculture 
impacts in Europe. The risk approach employs a probabilistic framework, which allows estimating the 
likelihoods of a variable of interest (crop yield, welfare) falling within a certain range.  
The document is organised in nine sections, including this introduction. Section 2 describes the main elements 
of the methodological framework. The next six sections deal with the economic analysis of impacts in each 
sector: river flooding (section 3), coastal flooding (section 4), droughts (section 5), agriculture crops (section 
6), energy supply (section 7) and mortality (section 8). The transboundary analysis and exploratory work on 
climate risk in agriculture appear in the Annexes. Section 9 summarises the main results and concludes. 
 
                                           
8 Only agricultural crops spillovers are analysed because the required global impacts data was available for this 
sector only. 
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2 Methodology 
As it has been already noted, it is very important to be aware that the sum of sectoral results presented in 
this report does not reflect the overall climate damages in Europe since several key impact categories have 
not been considered in the analysis. The results of this report should therefore not be interpreted as providing 
the full cost of climate change to Europe. 
The economic method relies on the use of Climate assessment General Equilibrium (CaGE, Pycroft et al. 
2016)9 model, which is a multi-sector, multi-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The 
computable general equilibrium methodology has been applied in the context of multi-sector climate impact 
analyses by several teams, like e.g. Bosello et al. (2012), Reilly et al. (2013) and, more recently, OECD (2015) 
and Hsiang et al. (2017). 
The sectoral studies provide direct damages either in monetary terms, as expected annual damage (EAD), or 
in a non-monetary metrics that can be linked to the parameters of the economic model. For instance, the river 
flood sectoral study computes the direct damage to infrastructure, measured as EAD in Euros; the agriculture 
study provides estimates of percentage changes in yields, which can be implemented into the CGE economic 
model as a productivity change. The CaGE model considers three main channels through which the direct 
damages affect the economic system: changes in productivity (e.g. due to lower agriculture yields), changes in 
capital stock (e.g. as a consequence of flood damages) and changes in private consumption (e.g. the repairing 
of the flood damages to residential buildings reduces the consumption possibilities of households, which 
consequently reduces their overall welfare). 
The CGE analysis accounts for the direct damages of climate change and the additional indirect effects in the 
economy due to the cross-sectoral (across sectors within the economy) and cross-country adjustments 
(across countries via international trade). The cross-sectoral impacts refer to effects on other economic 
sectors or markets of the economy that are linked to the sector undergoing the climate shock via commercial 
relations (for instance the relationship between the agricultural crops sector and the agro-food industry). 
There are also indirect effects in other economies due to the international trade flows between countries 
(both imports and exports). For instance, if one country faces a large negative shock, its production level will 
change, affecting imports from and exports to other economies. The CGE model has considered the 
international trade across the EU member states and, furthermore, the trade relationships with the rest of the 
world. 
Another advantage of the CGE methodology is that it considers the implicit, or market, adaptation via the 
changes in market prices. For instance, when the agriculture productivity is affected by climate change, the 
agriculture market and all other markets of the economy adjust via the economy price system. This is a 
general and broad process that involves all production factor and good markets of the country affected by 
climate and also the markets in the countries with which the country has trade relationships.  
The limitations of CGE modelling relate to the detailed parametrisation made e.g. for all the substitution 
elasticities in the nested production function (e.g. between capital and labour), which are challenging to 
estimate econometrically due to the lack of detailed data for all the production factors, sectors and regions 
considered in the model. Another limitation is due to the implicit structure imposed with the selected 
functional forms of the model equations, which influence the reactions of the model to external shocks. 
The results of the economic model are presented in welfare terms. Welfare refers to the utility or satisfaction 
obtained by households, closely related to their real consumption above the subsistence level.  
The economic analysis presented here looks into the valuation of the damage additional to the base period, so 
the current direct damage is subtracted from the direct damage of the climate scenarios10. This is because 
the current damage is implicitly accounted for in the database of the base year of the model; the current 
impacts of climate change in the base year have already been taken into account in the model database (the 
social account matrix, based on the input-output tables). 
The economic integration with the CaGE CGE model is made in a comparative static context, where future 
climate affects the economy as of today. The results estimated with the quasi-static framework of the CaGE 
model address the question: "what the economy would look like if the future climate occurs today?" Therefore, 
                                           
9 The model database is based on GTAP 9; all economic figures in the report are expressed in 2015 Euro. 
10 For example, today's river flood related losses (EAD) in the EU are estimated at 7.8bn€ annually, while they 
could reach 16.8bn€ under the 2oC scenario. The economic analysis estimates the consequences of the 
additional 9bn€ of damage (16.8bn€ - 7.8bn€). 
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for instance, the 2oC scenario results are to be interpreted as how much would be the losses if the 2oC climate 
would occur today, i.e. affecting the economy and society as of today. There are two justifications for 
implementing the static approach: first, to keep consistency with the biophysical impact analysis, where the 
direct climate damages are computed on the basis of constant exposure data, i.e. current land use, GDP and 
population; second, to avoid making questionable assumptions regarding the evolution of the economy and 
population to the end of the XXI century. For instance, land use can radically change in a generation therefore 
producing very different estimates of damages for the same inundation area due to a flood. By referring the 
impacts to the present economic structure, one does not need to make long-term assumptions on evolution of 
production factors, growth or economic structure, which could largely influence the key findings of the study. 
Because the model's database represents annual stocks and flows of the global economy, the results 
obtained reflect annual changes. In other words, the estimated economic impacts represent an annual change 
in welfare, but the possible effects on long-term economic growth are not considered in this assessment 
because the framework is static. Some studies in the literature have modelled how climate change can affect 
economic growth. For instance, Burke et al. (2015) used an econometric approach to estimate how climate 
change can affect economic growth. That approach does not consider the sectoral or bottom-up perspective 
implemented in this study. 
The CGE analysis considers the human mortality effects in a similar way to that of PESETA III. The economic 
or welfare loss due to the extreme temperature fatalities are valued using the value of statistical life (VSL; 
1.3 million Euro/person, same value as in PESETA III). The use of VSL can be controversial; the selected value 
is in the low end range of the literature. For instance, OCED (2012) proposes a range for the EU-27 average 
adult of USD 1.8 million to 5.4 million (2005-USD), with a base value of USD 3.6 million. 
The analysis is performed with five EU regions, aggregating the EU countries as follows: 
o Northern Europe: Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Denmark 
o UK and Ireland: UK and Ireland 
o Central Europe North: Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland 
o Central Europe South: Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania 
o Southern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain. 
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3 River floods 
The input into the economic analysis is based on the biophysical modelling described in Dottori et al. (2020). 
The biophysical analysis provides estimates of direct damage for the base period (1981-2010) and for the 
three warming levels. The economic implications of river flooding for the 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC scenarios are 
presented with respect to today’s economy, that is, as additional to the current losses11.  
Main conclusions: 
 EU welfare losses due to further warming could range between 5 bn € (1.5oC scenario) and 20 bn € 
(3oC scenario). 
 About 60% of the EU absolute welfare losses concentrate in the Central Europe regions. 
 Proportionally (as a share of GDP), the largest welfare losses are estimated for Northern Europe 
(0.32% of its GDP for the 3oC scenario) and for Central Europe South (0.26% of its GDP for the 3oC 
scenario). 
Figure 3 details the direct damages from river floods12. The grey bars reflect the base (current) level of 
damage and the green, blue and red bars show the additional damage estimated for the climate scenarios. 
The numbers plotted to the right of the bars show the total damage (base + future). The EU current direct 
damage is 7.8 bn €. The direct damage is estimated to increase by 4.7 bn € in the 1.5oC scenario, by 9 bn € in 
the 2oC scenario, and by 16.5 bn € in the 3oC scenario. The level of direct damages (including the base year 
damage) appears to be approximately linear with the warming level because doubling temperature from the 
1.5oC scenario to the 3oC scenario would roughly double the direct damages (from 12.5 bn € in the 1.5oC 
scenario to 24.37 bn € in the 3oC scenario). Comparing the damage additional to the base level in the three 
warming scenarios, shows a steeper increase in the damage levels, by a factor of almost 4 (from 4.6 in the 
1.5oC scenario to 16.5 bn € 3oC scenario), and those proportions also translate to welfare loses at the 
different warming levels.  
                                           
11 See the Methodology section for detailed explanation. 
12 The direct damage is specified for three different damage categories: agriculture, industry and residential 
buildings; each damage type would have a different effect on the economy. The agricultural direct damages 
are accounted for in the economic model as a change in the productivity of the agricultural sector. Damages 
to industry are represented as damage to the economy's capital stock, and damage to residential buildings is 
represented as an increase in households' subsistence spending. 
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Figure 3: Direct damage (EAD, bn €) from river flooding for the EU+UK, and the EU regions at the three climate scenarios. 
The grey bars reflect the base (current) level of damage and the green, blue and red bars show the additional damage 
estimated for the climate scenarios. The numbers plotted to the right of the bars show the total damage (base + future). 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
The welfare losses (additional to those in the base year) are reported in Figure 4 (in absolute terms), Figure 
5 (in relative terms, as a share of GDP) and in Table 1 (all the numerical values from the two previous 
figures). In absolute terms, the additional EU welfare losses are estimated at 5.5, 11 and 20 bn € at the three 
climate scenarios (1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC), respectively. The welfare losses are approximately 15-20% higher than 
the direct damages. About 60% of the additional EU welfare losses could be in the Central Europe North and 
Central Europe South regions, up to 20% in the Southern Europe, and about 10% in each of the Northern 
Europe and UK and Ireland regions.  
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Figure 4: Change in welfare from river flooding (bn €) for the three climate scenarios. The losses reflect the additional 
damage (EAD) with respect to the base (current) damage. The right axis refers to the EU results. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
 
When taking into consideration the relative sizes of the regional economies (GDP), the welfare reductions as a 
share in GDP (Figure 5 and Table 1, percentage change results) for the EU aggregate are 0.05%, 0.1% and 
0.16% for the respective three climate scenarios. The largest welfare loss is estimated for Northern Europe 
(0.05% of GDP in the 1.5oC scenario to 0.32% of GDP in the 3oC scenario) and Central Europe South (0.08% of 
GDP in the 1.5oC scenario to 0.26% of GDP in the 3oC scenario). The welfare losses of the other three regions 
are lower than the EU average (up to 0.13% of GDP in the 3oC scenario). 
 
Figure 5: Change in welfare from river flooding as share in GDP (%) for the three warming levels. The losses reflect the 
additional damage (EAD) with respect to the base (current) damage. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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Table 1: Welfare losses from river flooding (bn € and % of GDP) for the three climate scenarios; the losses reflect 
damage from warming additional to any current losses.  
Region 
Welfare (bn €) Welfare (% of GDP) 
1.5oC 2oC 3oC 1.5oC 2oC 3oC 
Northern Europe -0.4 -1.3 -2.8 -0.05 -0.15 -0.32 
UK & Ireland -0.6 -1.0 -2.3 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 
Central Europe North -1.3 -2.6 -5.0 -0.03 -0.07 -0.13 
Central Europe South -2.3 -4.5 -7.3 -0.08 -0.16 -0.26 
Southern Europe -0.9 -1.5 -2.5 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 
EU + UK -5.5 -10.8 -19.8 -0.04 -0.09 -0.16 
 Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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4 Coastal floods 
The input into the economic analysis is based on the biophysical modelling described in Vousdoukas et al. 
(2020). The biophysical analysis provides estimates of direct damage for the base period (1981-2010) and 
for the three climate scenarios. The economic implications of coastal flooding in the 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC 
scenarios are presented with respect to today’s economy, i.e. additional to the current losses.  
Main conclusions: 
 EU welfare losses from coastal floods due to further warming could increase by 3 bn € in the 1.5oC 
scenario, 5.6 bn € in the 2oC scenario and up to 20 bn € in the 3oC scenario, compared to nowadays. 
 About 50% of the EU welfare losses would occur in the two South Europe regions. 
 Proportionally, the largest welfare losses are estimated for UK & Ireland: up to 0.3% of its GDP in the 
3oC scenario. 
Figure 3 presents the direct damages from coastal floods13. The grey bars reflect the base (current) level of 
damage and the green, blue and red bars show the additional damage estimated for the climate scenarios. 
The numbers plotted to the right of the bars show the total damage (base + future). The current EU direct 
damage is 1.4 bn €. The direct damage is estimated to increase by 2.6 bn € in the 1.5oC scenario, by 4.9 bn € 
in the 2oC scenario, and by 17.2 bn € in the 3oC scenario. While in the river floods case the direct damages 
were rather linear with respect to the warming level, in the case of coastal floods the damages grow much 
faster than the warming level, with a very non-linear relationship. 
Figure 6: Direct damage (EAD, bn €) from coastal flooding for the EU regions at the three climate scenarios. The grey 
bars reflect the base (current) level of damage and the green blue and red bars show the additional damage estimated 
for the climate scenarios. The numbers plotted to the right of the bars show the total damage (base + future). 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
                                           
13 The direct damage has three different damage categories: industry, agriculture and residential buildings. 
Each type of damage would have a different effect in the economy, in the same way as the three categories 
of flood damages. The agricultural direct damages are accounted for in the economic model as a change in 
the productivity of the agricultural sector. Damages to industry are represented as damage to the economy's 
capital stock, and damage to residential buildings is represented as an increase in households' subsistence 
spending.  
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The welfare losses (additional to those in the base year) are reported in absolute terms in Figure 7, in 
relative terms (as a share of GDP) in Figure 8; Table 2 provides all the numerical values from the previous 
Figures. In absolute terms, the additional EU welfare losses are estimated at 3, 5.6 and 20 bn € for the three 
climate scenarios (1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC, respectively). The welfare losses are approximately 10% higher than 
the direct damages. About 75% of the additional EU welfare losses are equally divided between UK & Ireland, 
Central Europe South and Southern Europe. Further 15-20% of the EU losses are in Central Europe North, and 
about 5-10% in Northern Europe.  
 
Figure 7: Change in welfare from coastal flooding (bn €) for the three climate scenarios. The losses reflect the additional 
damage (EAD) with respect to the base (current) damage. The right axis refers to the EU results. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
The welfare reductions as a share of GDP (Figure 8 and Table 2) for the EU aggregate are 0.04%, 0.08% 
and 0.3% for the respective three climate scenarios. The largest welfare loss is estimated for UK & Ireland 
(0.04% of GDP in the 1.5oC scenario to 0.27% of GDP in the 3oC scenario) and Northern Europe (0.02% of 
GDP in the 1.5oC scenario to 0.17% of GDP in the 3oC scenario); Central Europe South has welfare losses in 
range 0.03% of GDP in the 1.5oC scenario to 0.16% of GDP in the 3oC scenario. The welfare losses of the 
other two regions are lower than the EU average (up to 0.16% of GDP). 
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Figure 8: Change in welfare from coastal flooding as share in GDP (%) for the three climate scenarios. The losses reflect 
the additional damage (EAD) with respect to the base (current) damage. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
 
Table 2: Welfare losses from coastal flooding (bn € and % of GDP) for the three climate scenarios. 
Region 
Welfare (bn €) Welfare (% of GDP) 
1.5oC 2oC 3oC 1.5oC 2oC 3oC 
Northern Europe -0.1 -0.3 -1.5 -0.02 -0.03 -0.17 
UK & Ireland -0.7 -1.4 -5.2 -0.04 -0.07 -0.27 
Central Europe North -0.5 -1.0 -3.1 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 
Central Europe South -0.7 -1.2 -4.8 -0.02 -0.04 -0.17 
Southern Europe -0.9 -1.8 -5.2 -0.03 -0.06 -0.16 
EU + UK -3.0 -5.6 -19.8 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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5 Droughts 
The input into the economic analysis is based on the biophysical modelling described in Cammalleri et al. 
(2020). The biophysical analysis provides estimates of direct damage for the base period (1981-2010) and 
for the three climate scenarios, 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC. The results show that global warming will progressively 
increase the frequency and severity of hydrological droughts in the Mediterranean and Atlantic European 
regions, while in Boreal and Continental Europe drought hazard will decline with warming. The economic 
implications of droughts in the 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC scenarios are presented with respect to today’s economy, 
that is, additional to the current losses; hence, if future direct damage is estimated lower that the current 
damage it would be modelled as a net reduction (benefit) in drought-related losses (see Figure 9 for an 
overview). 
Main conclusions: 
 Aggregate EU welfare losses from drought-related damage could increase from an additional 0.7 bn 
€ in the 1.5oC scenario to 10.6 bn € in the 3oC scenario. 
 Over 90% of the drought-related damage is estimated for the Southern Europe region in the 1.5oC 
scenario. The share remains very high, 75%, in the 2oC scenario and more than 50% under the 3oC 
warming scenario. 
Figure 9 depicts the direct damages from droughts14. The grey bars reflect the base (current) level of 
damage and the green, blue and red bars show the additional damage estimated for the three climate 
scenarios; the colour bars overlapping to the left onto the grey bars indicate the reduction of the damage for 
the respective warming level. The numbers plotted to the right of the bars show the total damage (base plus 
the future damages).  
The current EU direct damage is 9 bn €. The direct damage is estimated to increase by 0.7 bn € (7%) in the 
1.5oC climate scenario (green bar), by 3.2 bn € (35%) in the 2oC scenario (blue bar), and by 8.3 bn € (91%) in 
the 3oC scenario (red bar). At the regional level, the Northern Europe direct damage decreases with higher 
warming, from a current 0.4 bn € loss to a 0.2 bn € total loss (sum of the current and future impacts) under 
the 3oC warming level. UK and Ireland's direct damage more than doubles from 0.8 bn € today to a total loss 
of 1.9 bn € in the 3oC scenario. The Central regions' direct damage is estimated to decrease in the 1.5oC 
scenario (compared to the current damage), and then increase in the 3oC scenario, reaching a total damage of 
2.4 bn € in Central Europe North and 4.7 bn € in Central Europe South. Southern Europe has the largest 
regional current damage from droughts at 3.7 bn €, which is estimated to increase, with a total damage of 8 
bn € in the 3oC scenario. 
 
                                           
14 The direct damage is specified for different damage categories: agriculture, public water supply, power 
generation, commercial shipping, and subsidence in industry and in residential buildings - each type of the 
damage would have a different effect on the economy: agriculture: change in productivity of the 
agricultural sector; public water supply: change in productivity of the water supply service; power 
generation: reduced efficiency of energy production (sectoral productivity loss); commercial shipping: 
reduction in efficiency of water transport; subsidence: divided between capital loss in industry and damage 
to residential buildings . 
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Figure 9: Direct damage (EAD, bn €) from droughts for the EU regions at the three climate scenarios. The grey bars 
reflect the base (current) level of damage and the green, blue and red bars show the additional damage estimated for the 
climate scenarios; the colour bars overlapping to the left onto the grey bars indicate the reduction of the damage for the 
respective warming level. The numbers plotted to the right of the bars show the total damage (base plus future). 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
The welfare losses (additional to those in the base year) are reported in Figure 10 (in absolute terms), 
Figure 11 (in relative terms, as a share of GDP) and in Table 3 (all the numerical values from the two 
Figures). They largely reflect the magnitudes and regional pattern of the direct damage (Figure 9). In 
absolute terms, the additional EU welfare losses are estimated to be 0.7, 3.9 and 10.6 bn € for the three 
climate scenarios (1.5, 2 and 3oC, respectively). The most affected region is Southern Europe, whose drought-
related welfare losses constitute almost all of the EU losses in the 1.5oC (1.8 bn €), three-quarters of the EU 
losses at 2oC climate scenario (3 bn €), and half of the welfare losses under the 3oC scenario (5.6 bn €). In the 
3oC climate scenario, significant welfare losses are also estimated for UK & Ireland (1.5 bn €) and Central 
Europe South (3.1 bn €). 
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Figure 10: Change in welfare from drought (bn €) for the three climate scenarios. The losses reflect the additional 
damage (EAD) with respect to the base (current) damage. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Relative to the size of the economies (as a percentage share in GDP, Figure 11, and three last columns of 
Table 3), the EU welfare loss ranges from a small 0.01% reduction in the 1.5oC scenario to a 0.08% loss in 
the 3oC scenario. At the regional level, the welfare gains in Northern Europe are of around 0.04% of GDP in all 
scenarios. The UK and Ireland region could have a small welfare reduction in the 1.5oC scenario, and welfare 
losses of 0.08% of GDP in the 3oC scenario. The Central Europe regions show a similar small welfare increase 
in the 1.5oC scenario (0.01%-0.02% of GDP), and welfare losses in the 3oC scenario (0.02% in Central Europe 
North and 0.11% in Central Europe South). Welfare losses in Southern Europe are estimated to be the largest 
in the EU also in relative terms. The welfare loss is 0.06% in the 1.5oC scenario, 0.09% in the 2oC scenario and 
0.18% in the 3oC scenario.  
 
Figure 11: Change in welfare from droughts (% of GDP) for the three climate scenarios. The losses reflect the additional 
damage (EAD) with respect to the base (current) damage. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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Table 3: Change in welfare from droughts (bn € and % of GDP) for the three climate scenarios. The losses reflect the 
additional damage (EAD) with respect to the base (current) damage. 
Region 
Welfare (bn €) Welfare (% of GDP) 
1.5oC 2oC 3oC 1.5oC 2oC 3oC 
Northern Europe 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.04 0.05 0.04 
UK & Ireland -0.1 -0.4 -1.5 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 
Central Europe North 0.5 0.0 -0.8 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
Central Europe South 0.4 -1.0 -3.1 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 
Southern Europe -1.8 -3.0 -5.6 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18 
EU + UK -0.7 -3.9 -10.6 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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6 Agricultural crops  
The results of the economic analysis presented in this section are based on future yield changes provided by 
the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) together with the Inter-Sectoral 
Impact Model Intercomparison project (ISIMIP). The changes in productivity of agricultural crops resulting from 
future climate change, without the CO2 fertilisation effect, are used as an input to the economic model in 
order to assess the macroeconomic implications in the three warming scenarios: 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC.  
Main conclusions: 
 The EU welfare change is positive in the 1.5oC and 2oC scenarios, but the aggregate masks large 
regional differences. 
 In the 3oC scenario the welfare loss is estimated to be 4.3 bn € (with respect to the current 
economy).  
 Northern regions experience an increase in yield productivity, while southern regions face reductions 
in yields. 
The AgMIP project provides harmonised data on future yield changes based on multi-model simulations15. The 
yield changes for the EU regions16 are described in Figure 12. The yield changes are mainly increasing in the 
Northern regions of the EU and decreasing in the Southern regions. The difference in yields between 1.5oC and 
2oC are very small (less than 1%) and smaller than the difference between 2oC and 3oC, which can be of 
almost 4% and change sign, as in the UK and Ireland region, or the aggregate EU + UK. 
Figure 12: Changes in agricultural yields (%) 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
The welfare effects (additional to those in the base year) are reported in Figure 13 (in absolute terms), 
Figure 14 (in relative terms, as a share of GDP) and in Table 4 (all the numerical values from the two 
previous figures). At the aggregate EU level, there is a 3.2 bn € increase in welfare in the 1.5oC scenario, 
which, however, turns into a loss of around 4 bn € in the 3oC scenario. There is a small positive change in 
welfare in the Northern regions, which decreases with the warming level (becoming negative for UK and 
Ireland in the 3oC scenario). The Southern regions' welfare is in general negative (with a marginal small effect 
in Central Europe South in the 1.5oC scenario), reaching a 3.7 bn € welfare loss in the Southern Europe region 
in the 3oC scenario.  
                                           
15 The simulations build on 5 Climate (GCM) Models (HadGEM2-ES, IPSL-CM5A-LR, MIROC-ESM-CHEM, GFDL-
ESM2M, and NorESM1-M) and 7 Global Gridded Crop Models (EPIC, GEPIC, IMAGE, LPJmL, LPJ-GUESS, 
pDSSAT, and PEGASUS). This report uses the average values across the models. 
16 Yield change is introduced in the CGE model as a total factor productivity (TFP) change on the agricultural 
crops sector. Total factor productivity is defined as the ratio of production or output to the weighted 
average of the production factors. So it is assumed that the climate shock alters the productivity of all the 
production factors; i.e. climate is considered as an additional production factor. 
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Figure 13: Change in welfare (bn €) from crop productivity change for the EU regions for the three climate scenarios. The 
reported changes are with respect to current economy.  
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Placing the results in relation to the relative size of the regions (Figure 14, welfare change as a share of GDP, 
%) allows to illustrate the importance of the welfare changes for the regions. The proportional welfare losses 
are still the largest in the Central Europe South and Southern Europe regions, reaching around 0.1% in the 3oC 
scenario, both above the EU average. 
 
Figure 14: Change in welfare as share in GDP (%) from crop productivity change for the EU regions for the three climate 
scenarios. The reported welfare changes are with respect to the current economy.  
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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Table 4: Welfare change from crop productivity change (bn € and % of GDP), additional to current welfare levels 
Region 
Welfare (bn €) Welfare (% of GDP) 
1.5oC 2oC 3oC 1.5oC 2oC 3oC 
Northern Europe 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.06 0.06 0.02 
UK & Ireland 0.4 0.4 -0.3 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
Central Europe North 3.5 3.3 2.0 0.09 0.08 0.05 
Central Europe South 0.0 -0.3 -2.5 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 
Southern Europe -1.0 -1.4 -3.7 -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 
EU + UK 3.5 2.5 -4.3 0.03 0.02 -0.03 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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7 Energy supply 
This section presents the analysis of the economic consequences of changes in electricity production in 
Europe for the three climate scenarios: 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC. The input into the economic analysis is based on 
the biophysical modelling of Després and Adamovic (2020), who estimate the potential effects of climate 
change on electricity production. 
Main conclusions: 
 The changes in electricity production lead to welfare gains in Northern Europe and welfare losses in 
Southern Europe.  
 For most of the EU regions, the electricity supply reduction is the largest in the 1.5oC scenario, then 
at higher warming levels it becomes smaller or even turns into an increase. 
Figure 15 represents the change (%) in electricity production costs for the three climate scenarios. The 
energy modelling (Després and Adamovic, 2020) estimates almost no change in the electricity production cost 
for the EU and UK for the three climate scenarios (right bars of Figure 15). This net EU aggregate, however, 
is underpinned by significant regional differences. The largest reduction in electricity production cost is 
estimated for Northern Europe, in a range between 0.7% in the 1.5oC scenario and 4.4% in the 3oC scenario. 
Smaller reductions in the production costs, in the range of 0.1%-0.3%, are also modelled for UK and Ireland 
and for Central Europe South (1.5oC and 2oC only). Central Europe North is modelled to have a small increase 
in the electricity production cost, but in a very small range: from 0.04% to 0.1%. The largest increase is 
estimated for Southern Europe, where the production cost of electricity could increase by 0.5% in the 1.5oC 
scenario, by 0.6% in the 2oC scenario and by 0.9% in the 3oC scenario. 
 
Figure 15: Change (%) in electricity production cost for the three climate scenarios (1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC).  
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
The welfare losses (additional to those in the base year) are reported in Figure 16 (in absolute terms), Figure 
17 (in relative terms, as a share of GDP) and in Table 5 (all the numerical values from the two previous 
figures). At the regional level, Northern Europe has the largest welfare increase in all the climate scenarios: 
0.4 bn € in the 1.5oC scenario, 1.2 bn € in the 2oC scenario and 2.2 bn € in the 3oC scenario. For two other EU 
regions, UK and Ireland and Central Europe South (1.5oC and 2oC only), the change is also positive but of a 
smaller magnitude, in a range of 0.07 bn € to 0.18 bn €. Estimates for Central Europe North show a small 
welfare loss no larger than 0.16 bn €. The largest welfare losses are modelled for Southern Europe which 
could lose 0.7 bn € in the 1.5oC scenario, 1 bn € in the 2oC scenario and 1.4 bn € in the 3oC scenario.  
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Figure 16: Change in welfare (bn €) for the three climate scenarios. The losses reflect the change in production cost of 
electricity with respect to nowadays. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
When the welfare change is considered relative to the GDP size of the regions (as % of GDP, Figure 17), the 
largest proportional change is found in Northern Europe: 0.04% to 0.26% of GDP. The second most significant 
change is for Southern Europe, where the welfare loss is in range of 0.02% to 0.04% of GDP. For the rest of 
the EU regions, UK and Ireland, Central Europe North and Central Europe South, the proportional change is 
very small, in a range of 0.001% to 0.01% of GDP. 
 
Figure 17: Change in welfare as share in GDP (%) for the three climate scenarios. The losses reflect the change in 
production cost of electricity with respect to nowadays. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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Table 5: GDP and welfare changes due to the electricity production cost change 
Region 
Welfare (bn €) Welfare (% of GDP) 
1.5oC 2oC 3oC 1.5oC 2oC 3oC 
Northern Europe 0.38 1.24 2.22 0.044 0.143 0.256 
UK & Ireland 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.009 0.006 0.004 
Central Europe North -0.05 -0.16 -0.14 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
Central Europe South 0.16 0.17 -0.35 0.006 0.006 -0.013 
Southern Europe -0.70 -0.99 -1.37 -0.022 -0.032 -0.044 
EU + UK -0.04 0.39 0.43 0.000 0.003 0.003 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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8 Mortality from heat and cold 
Naumann et al. (2020) provide a quantitative assessment of human mortality from temperature extremes 
(both cold and heat waves) in Europe for the three climate scenarios, compared to the current period. The 
morality is estimated under the current socio economic conditions17.  
Main conclusions: 
 Under the 3oC climate scenario, the EU fatalities due to heat and cold waves can be 33 times higher 
than under the current climate. 
 The welfare losses can reach 36, 65 and 122 bn € for the three climate scenarios 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC, 
respectively. 
 Around 80% of the welfare losses are estimated to occur in the two southern EU regions. 
Figure 18 presents the heat-and cold-related mortality for the EU and the UK and the EU regions in the 
current period (base) and the three climate scenarios. The EU mortality increases rapidly with warming. 
Today's 2,800 EU fatalities increase more than ten-fold to 30,000 people in the 1.5oC scenario, then to 
52,000 in the 2oC scenario and to the 95,000 in the 3oC scenario. The mortality also strongly increases 
southwards, with more than half of the EU fatalities (95,000 in the 3oC climate scenario) occurring in the 
Southern Europe region alone (53,000 in the 3oC climate scenario). 
Figure 18: Expected annual fatalities from heat and cold in the three climate scenarios (thousands of persons). The right 
axis refers to the EU + UK results. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
The rate of increase of fatalities with warming across regions is relatively similar in the 1.5oC scenario (about 
ten times the base level) and 2oC (about 15 times the base level), but diverges in the 3oC scenario: it is about 
25 times the base level in the Northern regions, but almost 35 times the base level in the Southern regions. 
The welfare loss is calculated with a monetary estimate of mortality, using the value of statistical life (VSL) 
method. The number of premature deaths is multiplied by the VSL, which provides an estimate of the welfare 
loss. The assumed VSL is 1.3 million euro/person (2015 Euro; same value for all member states), as in the 
previous PESETA studies, the low-end of the range of estimates considered in the review of the European 
Clean Air Policy Package (European Commission, 2013). 
Figure 19 and Table 6 show the welfare losses for the EU and the UK and its regions. The welfare losses are 
calculated with respect to the current mortality levels, i.e. they show the additional (net) loss due to the 
increase in temperature. Since the monetised damage is computed as a product of the number of fatalities 
                                           
17 Forzieri et al. (2017) consider the impact due to climate change and population dynamics, and find that 
climate change represents approximately 90% of the overall impact.  
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(Figure 18) and a constant VSL, the proportions between the welfare losses for the regions and the warming 
levels reflect those of mortality. 
 
Figure 19: Welfare losses due to increase in mortality from heat and cold (difference from current period), bn €. The right 
axis refers to the EU + UK results. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
The aggregate EU welfare loss in the 1.5oC scenario is estimated to be 36 bn €, compared to today, increasing 
to 65 bn € in the 2oC scenario and to over 122 bn € in the 3oC scenario. More than 80% of the losses are in 
the two South EU regions. 
 
Table 6: Welfare losses due to increase in mortality from heat and cold (difference from base period, bn €) 
Region 1.5oC 2oC 3oC 
Northern Europe 0.09 0.14 0.22 
UK & Ireland 1.11 1.81 2.85 
Central Europe North 6.56 10.33 16.96 
Central Europe South 10.70 18.67 32.91 
Southern Europe 17.65 34.10 68.93 
EU + UK 36.10 65.05 121.88 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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9 Summary of impacts 
Global warming of 3oC would result in an additional annual welfare loss of 175 bn € (1.38% of GDP). Under a 
warming of 2oC the annual welfare loss would be 83bn € (0.65% of GDP) and if the warming is limited to 
1.5oC the welfare loss would be reduced to 42bn € (0.33 % of GDP). The 3oC welfare loss is lower than that of 
the JRC PESETA III project because of the much lower warming level considered.  
Figure 20: Welfare change from selected climate impacts (% of GDP) for the EU-27 and UK, and for the constituent EU 
macro regions, for three levels of global warming. The results represent change with respect to current economy. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Sectoral impacts 
Human mortality from heat dominates the (incomplete) overall economic impacts. The related welfare losses 
can reach 36, 65 and 122 bn € for the three climate scenarios (1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC, respectively). More than 
80% of the mortality related welfare losses are estimated for southern EU regions.  
River and coastal floods are the second most significant sources of welfare loss in the EU, particularly in the 
northern and central EU regions. Those two impact categories alone constitute 8.5 bn € of additional welfare 
loss at 1.5oC, increasing to 16 bn € at 2oC and to 40 bn € at 3oC warming level.  
When compared to nowadays, changes in the frequency and severity of droughts lead to a small increase in 
welfare in Northern Europe, but become a major source of welfare reduction in the southern EU regions: 8.7 
bn € in the southern EU regions compared to 10.6 bn € for the EU total in the 3oC scenario. 
Climate impacts due to changes in agriculture yields lead to an increase in welfare in the north of EU and a 
reduction in the south. The additional welfare losses in the southern EU regions increase from 1 bn € in the 
1.5oC scenario to more than 6 bn € under the 3oC scenario. At the same time, in northern EU regions the 
welfare increases by 4.5 bn € in the 1.5oC scenario but the gain declines with further warming to 2 bn € under 
the 3oC warming level.  
The energy model simulates a positive effect of global warming on electricity supply in the north and an 
opposite trend the south. These regional effects are balanced at 1.5°C and result in a small increase in 
welfare at 2oC and 3°C global warming. 
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In general, the welfare losses (excluding mortality) are around 20% higher than the direct damages computed 
in biophysical models. Those 20% reflect how the rest of the overall economy would be indirectly affected by 
climate change.  
The North-South divide 
There is a clear North-South divide in the regional distribution of welfare losses. The sums of impacts in 
northern regions are relatively small or even positive (e.g. Northern Europe at 1.5oC and 2oC), and the regions 
also experience gains from climate change for some of the sectors (agriculture, droughts' frequency, energy 
supply). In the southern regions almost all of the impacts are negative (except droughts in Central Europe 
South at 1.5oC and energy supply at 2 and 3oC). The magnitude of welfare losses in the southern regions is 
several times larger compared to those in the North of Europe. 
Transboundary effects from the rest of the world 
The EU economy is affected not only by climate impacting directly upon its economy, but also indirectly 
through international trade with countries which also experience climate-related damages. The findings 
confirm a more comprehensive analysis from PESETA III that the international spillovers could increase the 
internal EU welfare losses by approximately 20%. A detailed analysis of agricultural yields shows that the 
agricultural spillovers can reach between 2 bn € at 1.5oC to 8 bn € at 3oC; at 2oC the negative transboundary 
effects dominate the positive EU's own welfare increase leading to an overall welfare loss. Further 
exploratory research on probabilistic perspective on climate change impacts illustrated that the increase in 
global temperature leads not only to reduction in potential yields but also to increase in uncertainty regarding 
the production levels. 
 
Figure 21: Welfare change from selected climate impacts excluding mortality (% of GDP) for the EU-27 and UK, and for 
the constituent EU macro regions, for three levels of global warming. The results represent change with respect to current 
economy. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
 
Comparison of PESETA IV vs PESETA III 
The economic valuation of climate impacts in PESETA IV are different when compared to the results of 
PESETA III for three main reasons. Mainly, the reported damages in PESETA IV are lower because they are 
estimated for 3oC warming level, which would occur in the 2060s for the RCP8.5 scenario, while PESETA III 
reported damages for the end of the century (2100) time horizon. Secondly, there is a different set of sectoral 
impacts covered in the two projects. While PESETA III included river floods, coastal floods, agriculture, 
residential energy demand, mortality and labour productivity in the economic valuation, PESETA IV has 
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included river floods, costal floods, agriculture, energy supply, mortality, windstorms and droughts. Finally, 
there have been some improvements in the sectoral biophysical methodologies since PESETA III.  
 
Figure 22: Comparison of results of the PESETA III (P3) and PESETA IV (P4) projects. 
 
Source: PESETA III (2018) and PESETA IV (2020). 
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Table 7: Welfare change from selected climate impacts (bn € and % of GDP) for the EU-27+UK, and for the constituent 
EU macro regions, for three levels of global warming. The results represent change with respect to current economy. 
Sector Region 
Welfare change, bn € 
(additional to base) 
Welfare change as share in 
GDP (%) 
1.5oC 2oC 3oC 1.5oC 2oC 3oC 
Inland floods 
Northern Europe -0.4 -1.3 -2.8 -0.05 -0.15 -0.32 
UK & Ireland -0.6 -1.0 -2.3 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 
Central Europe North -1.3 -2.6 -5.0 -0.03 -0.07 -0.13 
Central Europe South -2.3 -4.5 -7.3 -0.08 -0.16 -0.26 
Southern Europe -0.9 -1.5 -2.5 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 
EU + UK -5.5 -10.8 -19.8 -0.04 -0.09 -0.16 
Coastal floods 
Northern Europe -0.1 -0.3 -1.5 -0.02 -0.03 -0.17 
UK & Ireland -0.7 -1.4 -5.2 -0.04 -0.07 -0.27 
Central Europe North -0.5 -1.0 -3.1 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 
Central Europe South -0.7 -1.2 -4.8 -0.02 -0.04 -0.17 
Southern Europe -0.9 -1.8 -5.2 -0.03 -0.06 -0.16 
EU + UK -3.0 -5.6 -19.8 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 
Agriculture 
Northern Europe 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.06 0.06 0.02 
UK & Ireland 0.4 0.4 -0.3 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
Central Europe North 3.5 3.3 2.0 0.09 0.08 0.05 
Central Europe South 0.0 -0.3 -2.5 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 
Southern Europe -1.0 -1.4 -3.7 -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 
EU + UK 3.5 2.5 -4.3 0.03 0.02 -0.03 
Droughts 
Northern Europe 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.04 0.05 0.04 
UK & Ireland -0.1 -0.4 -1.5 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 
Central Europe North 0.5 0.0 -0.8 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
Central Europe South 0.4 -1.0 -3.1 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 
Southern Europe -1.8 -3.0 -5.6 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18 
EU +UK -0.7 -3.9 -10.6 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 
Energy 
Northern Europe 0.4 1.2 2.2 0.04 0.14 0.26 
UK & Ireland 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Central Europe North -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Central Europe South 0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Southern Europe -0.7 -1.0 -1.4 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
EU +UK 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mortality 
Northern Europe -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
UK & Ireland -1.1 -1.8 -2.8 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 
Central Europe North -6.6 -10.3 -17.0 -0.17 -0.26 -0.43 
Central Europe South -10.7 -18.7 -32.9 -0.38 -0.67 -1.18 
Southern Europe -17.6 -34.1 -68.9 -0.56 -1.09 -2.20 
EU +UK -36.1 -65.0 -121.9 -0.29 -0.51 -0.96 
Sum of the sectors 
Northern Europe 0.6 0.5 -1.7 0.07 0.06 -0.20 
UK & Ireland -1.9 -4.2 -12.0 -0.10 -0.22 -0.62 
Central Europe North -4.5 -10.8 -24.0 -0.11 -0.27 -0.61 
Central Europe South -13.1 -25.4 -50.9 -0.47 -0.91 -1.83 
Southern Europe -23.0 -42.7 -87.3 -0.73 -1.36 -2.78 
EU +UK -41.9 -82.6 -175.9 -0.33 -0.65 -1.39 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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Annex 1. Global spillovers  
The EU economy is affected not only by climate change impacting upon its businesses, infrastructure and 
resources, but also indirectly through international trade with the rest of the world, which also experiences 
climate-related impacts. Those additional impacts are called spillover or transboundary effects. This section 
presents an illustrative example of the transboundary effects for agricultural yields changes in the three 
warming scenarios, 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC. 
The transboundary effects are computed using the CGE CaGE model. In a hypothetical scenario, only the 
regions outside of the EU are subjected to the change in agricultural yields from climate change. Under that 
scenario the model evaluates the changes in economic activity (GDP) and welfare in the EU and the UK 
because of the international trade linkages with the rest of the world.  
The main conclusions of the exploratory analysis are: 
 Agricultural spillovers in the EU and the UK are significant and can reach between 2 bn € in the 1.5oC 
scenario to 8 bn € in the 3oC scenario. 
 In the 2oC scenario, the negative transboundary effects are of greater magnitude than the positive 
EU’s own GDP growth from yields increase (section 6).  
 Most of the agricultural transboundary effects originate in the Americas and Asia. 
The agricultural transboundary effects amount to a reduction in EU’s GDP of 2.6 bn € in the 1.5oC scenario 
(0.02% of GDP), 3.7 bn € in the 2oC scenario (0.03% of GDP) and more than 8 bn € in the 3oC scenario (0.06% 
of GDP). Those losses are additional to the GDP changes due to the climate impacts occurring within the EU as 
presented in section 5. The respective welfare losses amount to 0.6 bn € in the 1.5oC scenario (0.008% of 
welfare), 0.8 bn € in the 2oC scenario (0.012%), and 1.7 bn € (0.024%) in the 3oC scenario.  
Figure 23 presents the impacts on GDP and welfare due to the transboundary effects (diagonally striped 
areas) and also to the own EU effects (plainly coloured areas); the combined affected is represented with the 
red lines. The spillover values are significant in comparison to the economic losses from the internal EU 
climate changes on agriculture (section 6). For the 1.5oC and 2oC scenarios, the sign of the climate impact 
from the rest of the world is negative (damage), while the domestic impact is positive (benefit). Although the 
1.5oC scenario in the EU is estimated to produce an increase in yields, which could lead to an increase in GDP 
by 3.2 bn €, more damaging climate impacts in the rest of the world are estimated to have a negative impact 
on the EU GDP of almost as much (2.6 bn €), netting a small positive balance. In the 2oC scenario the spillover 
impact is larger than the domestic EU effect: 3.7 bn € vs 2.3 bn €, respectively, with the negative balance of 
1.4 bn €. In the 3oC scenario both the EU’s impact and the spillover are negative, adding up to a 12 bn € GDP 
loss.  
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Figure 23: Comparison of GDP and welfare changes (both in bn €) from EU agricultural climate impacts and from the 
transboundary effects in the rest of the world 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Figure 24 and Figure 25 show the geography of the transboundary effects on the EU for GDP and welfare 
impacts, respectively. The figures present the total EU loss from global spillovers (the large central bar chart) 
and how this total loss originates from the different global regions (smaller regional graphs). The numerical 
values are reported in Table 8. The extent of the spillover effect is a function of two features: firstly, it 
depends on the magnitude of climate impacts in the third regions and the regions’ vulnerability to climatic 
change. Secondly, since the regional climate damage affects the EU via trade and prices, the intensity of 
international trade serves as a vehicle for the spillover effect.  
Most of the EU agricultural transboundary GDP effects originate in North America and Central and Southern 
Asia and, to a lesser extent, in South America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern and South East Asia. Welfare 
losses from other global regions are smaller than the GDP effects, and are mainly due to climate impacts in 
the Americas and Africa. Small but positive welfare effects due to climate changes in Central, South and East 
Asia are due to reductions in import prices and trade diversion, when the EU agricultural production becomes 
more competitive relatively to other regions affected by climate change.  
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Figure 24: GDP loss (%) in the EU from climate impacts on agriculture in other global regions in the 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC scenarios.  
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Note: The large bar graph shows the total EU GDP loss from the spillovers, while the smaller regional charts show the EU GDP loss due to climate impacts in the individual 
regions. 
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Figure 25: Welfare loss (%) in the EU from climate impacts on agriculture in other global regions in the 1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC scenarios. 
 Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Note: The large bar graph shows the total EU welfare loss from the spillovers, while the smaller regional charts show the EU welfare loss due to climate impacts in the 
individual regions.
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Table 8: GDP (%) and welfare losses (%) in the EU from climate impacts in agriculture in the rest of the world for the 
1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC scenarios 
Region 
GDP, % Welfare, % 
1.5oC 2oC 3oC 1.5oC 2oC 3oC 
North America -0.005 -0.007 -0.016 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 
Central and Southern Asia -0.006 -0.008 -0.017 0.001 0.002 0.004 
Rest of Europe 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
North Africa and Western Asia -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.003 -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 
Central America and Caribbean 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
South America -0.002 -0.004 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 
Australia, New Zealand and 
Oceania 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Eastern and South East Asia -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.002 0.005 
EU total -0.021 -0.029 -0.064 -0.008 -0.012 -0.024 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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Annex 2. Exploration of risk analysis - agriculture 
The climate model runs underlying the scenarios of the JRC PESETA IV project do not consider that they can 
occur with certain probabilities. This section presents an exploratory analysis of a formal probabilistic 
perspective on climate change impacts, taking into account the risk of occurrence of different magnitudes of 
climate change. This exploratory study focuses only on wheat production. The main finding is that higher 
global temperature leads not only to a higher reduction in potential agriculture (wheat) yields but also to an 
increase in the uncertainty range regarding the yield changes (in other words, higher warming may lead to 
higher wheat yield reductions, but also they are more uncertain). 
The method builds on a probabilistic climate ensemble constructed for Europe as in Rasmussen et al (2015). 
The ensemble provides daily projections of temperature and precipitation for the period 1981-2099, gridded 
at 0.25o. The ensemble consists of 33 global circulation models (GCMs), of which 21 are the CMIP5 models 
and 12 are 'surrogate' models created in order to obtain the complete probabilistic distribution, 
complementing the CMIP5 models. Each of the 33 climate models carries a probability (weight) of its 
occurrence in the future, such that the sum of probabilities for all GCMs is equal to one (i.e. ∑ 𝑃(𝐺𝐶𝑀𝑖) =
33
𝑖=1
1) , where P(GCMi) is the probability of the climate run from the ith GCM. The temperature and precipitation 
series, together with data on soil and CO2 concentrations, were fed to a crop growth emulator (Blanc, 2017) to 
calculate wheat yield at 0.5o grid level. The wheat yields were further aggregated to country-level using 
gridded values of production data (FAO). Finally, the change in wheat yield was simulated in the CAGE 
economic model to obtain the implications on economic activity and welfare. 
The working example presented here concerns climate impacts in a single agricultural crop – wheat. Figure 
26 represents the share of wheat production in total crop production for each of the EU regions (bar chart on 
the left), and the shares of the total EU wheat production in each region (pie chart on the right). Three 
quarters of wheat in the EU are produced in the two Central Europe regions, although the share of wheat 
production in the total crop production in any of those regions does not exceed 20%, and it is as low as 3% in 
Southern Europe.  
 
Figure 26: Share of wheat production in all crops production for each of the EU regions (bar chart), and shares of the 
total EU wheat production by the sub regions (pie chart) 
 
 
Table 9 presents the main results, yield changes in percentage terms with respect to the current production. 
The yield changes are represented in probabilistic terms, following the terminology of the IPPC AR5 
(Mastrandrea et al. 2010); the term ‘likely’ indicates that the likelihood of the range of yield changes reported 
is between 66% and 100%, 'very likely' refers to results with a likelihood between 90% and 100%. For 
example, in the Northern Europe region for the 1.5oC scenario (first row of Table 9) it is likely (67% chance or 
more) that the wheat production change will be between a 0.83% reduction and a 0.45% increase, and it is 
very likely (90% chance or more) that the yield change will be between a 1.34% reduction and a 0.83% 
increase. 
 
  
45 
 
Table 9: Impact of climate on wheat production, percentage change from current production levels 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
Figure 27 represents the probability distribution of the EU regions wheat yield changes (percentage 
compared to nowadays) for the different climate scenarios (1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC). The median yield change is 
the value at the top or the centre of the distribution function. The solid areas represent the likely ranges and 
the shaded area represent the very likely ranges. The median yield change decreases with temperature in all 
regions. The reduction is most significant in Central Europe South (0.4%, 0.7% and 1.3% for the three climate 
scenarios, respectively). Furthermore, the distribution of potential yield changes widens with the increase in 
temperature. For instance, in Northern Europe the very likely spread in yield changes increases from 2.1 % in 
the 1.5oC scenario (sum of 1.3% and 0.8%, first row of Table 9) to 2.4 % in the 2oC scenario and to 3.0 % in 
the 3oC warming level scenario. In Central Europe South the spread increases to 2, 2.5 and 3.5 percentage 
point for the three climate scenarios, respectively. Therefore, the increase in global temperature leads not 
only to a reduction in yields changes but also to an increase in the uncertainty regarding the yield changes.  
The Northern Europe and the Central Europe South regions have the widest uncertainty ranges among the EU 
regions, while the Central Europe North and Southern Europe regions have much narrower uncertainty ranges. 
Very likely Likely Very likely Likely Very likely Likely
Northern Europe -1.34  to  0.83 -0.83  to  0.45 -1.52  to  0.84 -0.99  to  0.37 -2.24  to  0.83 -1.51  to  0.27
UK & Ireland -0.80  to  1.24 -0.49  to  0.65 -0.82  to  1.21 -0.51  to  0.63 -1.04  to  1.30 -0.69  to  0.62
Central Europe North -0.57  to  0.29 -0.35  to  0.14 -0.71  to  0.27 -0.50  to  0.11 -1.32  to  0.31 -0.97  to  0.02
Central Europe South -1.25  to  0.69 -0.92  to  0.31 -1.76  to  0.68 -1.33  to  0.15 -2.87  to  0.63 -2.26  to  -0.09
Southern Europe -0.32  to  0.16 -0.24  to  0.04 -0.45  to  0.14 -0.35  to  0.01 -0.66  to  0.08 -0.53  to  -0.06
Region
1.5
o
C 2
o
C 3
o
C
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Figure 27: Distribution of wheat yield percentage change (compared to nowadays) for the different climate scenarios 
(1.5oC, 2oC and 3oC) for the EU regions. The median yield change is the value at the top or the centre of the distribution 
function. The solid areas represent the likely ranges and the shaded area represent the very likely ranges. 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
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Table 10 and Figure 28 show how the wheat yield changes translate into GDP changes.  
Table 10: Impact of wheat yield change on GDP (percentage change) 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020. 
 
It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the GDP change depends not only on the wheat yield change, 
but also on the importance of wheat production in the regional economy (left side of Figure 26) and on the 
scale of the indirect effects of climate change through other regions via the spillover effects18. Those 
mechanisms are well illustrated for the case of Southern Europe: the median yield changes from 0.1% in the 
1.5oC scenario to 0.2% in the 2oC scenario and 0.3% in the 3oC scenario. The resulting GDP effect, however, is 
relatively small compared to, for example, Central Europe North, whose wheat yields change is of similar 
magnitude but the GDP reduction is greater by around an order of magnitude; in fact, the Southern Europe 
GDP marginally increases. The small GDP effect is due to a very small portion of the crops sector in Southern 
Europe producing wheat (less than 3% - Figure 26), which gives a small leverage to the yield percentage 
reduction. The actual increase in Southern Europe's GDP steams from the transboundary effects: because the 
other EU regions are relatively more affected by climate change, the Southern Europe wheat production 
becomes more competitive and expands, stimulating GDP growth.  
 
                                           
18 The economy is affected not only by climate impacting upon its businesses, infrastructure and resources, but 
also indirectly through international trade with countries that also experience climate-related damage. 
Annex 1 illustrates the impact of the rest of the world regions in the EU economy, but the spillovers also 
exist between the EU regions. 
Very likely Likely Very likely Likely Very likely Likely
Northern Europe -0.024  to  0.042 -0.011  to  0.028 -0.028  to  0.043 -0.013  to  0.028 -0.031  to  0.045 -0.017  to  0.031
UK & Ireland -0.020  to  0.017 -0.013  to  0.009 -0.030  to  0.017 -0.021  to  0.008 -0.043  to  0.012 -0.032  to  0.002
Central Europe North -0.103  to  0.061 -0.074  to  0.021 -0.124  to  0.070 -0.090  to  0.022 -0.139  to  0.071 -0.101  to  0.018
Central Europe South -0.157  to  0.134 -0.108  to  0.068 -0.177  to  0.093 -0.130  to  0.035 -0.210  to  0.047 -0.159  to  -0.012
Southern Europe -0.006  to  0.009 -0.004  to  0.006 -0.006  to  0.008 -0.003  to  0.006 -0.005  to  0.007 -0.003  to  0.005
Region
1.5 o C 2 o C 3 o C
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Figure 28: Distribution of GDP percentage change from wheat yield under the three warming scenarios (the bottom-right 
graphics shows how the regional distributions comparison with a uniform scale) 
 
Source: PESETA IV, 2020 
 
  
 
 
 
 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre 
nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. 
Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see 
https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 
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